Moral Cleansing and Moral Licenses: experimental evidence by Pablo Brañas-Garza et al.
1	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence
* 
 
Pablo Brañas-Garza, GLOBE: Universidad de Granada, Spain 
Marisa Bucheli, Universidad de la República, Uruguay 
María Paz Espinosa, Universidad del País Vasco, BRIDGE, Spain 
Teresa García-Muñoz, GLOBE: Universidad de Granada, Spain 
 
ABSTRACT-  Research  on  moral  cleansing  and  moral  self-licensing  has 
introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad 
actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in 
future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a 
positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage 
in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal 
state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior 
behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal 
level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the 
optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good 
and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a 
sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We 
find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign 
is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to 
what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a 
regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) 
and cleansing (altruistic after selfish). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
How and why moral behavior emerges is a critical question. Moral behavior is not 
costless. Every single altruistic action generates a cost for the donor and thus good 
deeds  need  to  come  with  a  benefit  to  compensate  the  cost.  Despite  a  number  of 
classical evolutionary arguments such as kin selection –Hamilton rule- or reciprocal 
altruism (Fehr and Fischbauer, 2003), a series of papers have dealt with more self-
centered arguments such as identity, guilt-aversion or warm-glow, that describe the 
benefits of being moral (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006, Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007 and Aguiar et al., 2010). In this paper, we are 
interested in the moral self-licensing and moral cleansing literature that explore the 
relationship between past, present and future moral behavior. 
One motivation for good deeds is their positive effect on moral self-worth. When past 
actions make people feel confident about their moral behavior, their moral self-regard 
could be high enough to allow them to engage in morally dubious behavior in the 
present (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006; Merritt, Effron and Monin, 2010). This is the 
central argument of the moral self-licensing literature. In a review of the evidence, 
Merritt et al (2010) present the two most frequent moral-licensing mechanisms used 
in the literature: the moral credits and the credentials models. The moral credits model 
uses  a  moral  bank  account  metaphor:  good  deeds  purchase  “moral  credits”  that 
diminish the discomfort of engaging in bad deeds in the future. In the credentials 
model,  actions  affect  the  meaning  of  future  actions:  the  value  of  an  ambiguous 
behavior will be valued through the lens of past good deeds. As	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsequence,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠgives	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐license	 ﾠto	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠtransgressions.	 ﾠNote that according to the mechanism 
of the first model, the licensed person gets involved in what he considers a bad action 
but this is not the case in the second model. So the damage to self-value is different 
and we may expect self-license to lead to a lower number of transgressions under the 
moral credits than the credentials mechanism.  
In turn, immoral behavior has a negative effect on moral self-worth. After engaging in 
bad  deeds,  people  follow  a  moral  behavior  to  recover  the  lost  self-worth;  this 
mechanism is the so-called moral cleansing behavior (see Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin, 
2009).  One  well  documented  example  is  that  in  response  to  sins,  many  religious 3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
practices require bodily purification.    
Taking into account the two types of behavior, moral licensing and moral cleansing, 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) consider “moral behavior as being embedded within a larger 
system that contains competing forces. Moral or immoral actions may emerge from 
an attempt to find balance among these forces”. The process is symmetric: every 
deviation from the normal behavior is subsequently balanced with either a more moral 
action (moral cleansing) or less moral action (moral licensing). In their experiment, 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) show that affirming a moral identity (participants were asked 
to write a self-relevant story containing positive traits) leads people to donate less to 
charities  (moral  licensing);  when  moral  identity  is  threatened  (story  containing 
negative traits), generosity in donations to charity is a means to regain some lost self-
worth (moral cleansing).  
Our paper provides further evidence on this phenomenon of moral self-regulation in a 
dynamic context. We analyze data from an economic experiment where subjects play 
a sequence of 16 dictator games, each with a different randomly chosen recipient 
(anonymity conditions). All the games have the same structure and they are framed. 
Besides  a  blind  (baseline)  game,  we  use  three  types  of  frames  regarding  the 
information  given  about  gender  (male/female),  income  (poor/rich)  and  political 
preferences (right wing/left wing) of the dictator and the recipient, to generate 15 
different environments. Each subject played the 16 games in a different random order 
to control for order effects.  
This design tries to recreate the sequentially of decisions, to test the hypothesis of 
moral  self-regulation  that  would  lead  individuals  to  reverse  previous  moral  or 
immoral behavior. The alternative hypothesis is that subjects would always behave 
according to their moral standards and therefore we would observe no reversion. 
Our  estimation  technique  takes  into  account  the  dynamics  of  these  actions;  we 
estimate how a donation by each individual (dt-1) affects the subsequent one (dt). We 
find that donations over time follow an auto-regressive process of order one (AR(1)) 
with a negative coefficient.
† We draw two important conclusions from this analysis: 
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i.  the negative sign of the effect of the immediate past actions (dt-1) on current 
choices (dt) indicates that subjects reverse in every round what they did in the 
past; 
ii.  the  length  of  the  auto-regressive  process  (AR(1))  indicates  that  only  the 
previous period affects present behavior. Hence, subjects tend to balance in 
period t what they did in period t-1.  
Our result implies that self-regulation is not a long memory process, since only the 
previous period matters. This could be due to the fact that decisions in our experiment 
are not overly asymmetric so that only one period is sufficient to reverse what the 
subjects did in the past. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set the theoretical 
framework. Section III describes the experiment design and procedures, Sections IV 
and V contain the results and their robustness and in Section VI we present some 
concluding remarks.  
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This  section  presents  a  dynamic  model  for  the  paradox  of  moral  self-regulation 
(Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin, 2009). In this theoretical framework, decisions with a 
moral content have to be taken over time and subjects self-regulate to achieve their 
optimal level of moral self-worth. 
Assume that up to period t, a subject i is at her optimal level of goodness G*, that is, 
she has taken decisions that have placed her in a situation where her moral self-worth 
is at the right level.  This optimal level of goodness G* is obtained taking into account 
the costs and benefits of moral self-worth, that is, the level of G* maximizes B(G)-
C(G), the benefits minus the costs.  
We assume that preferences concerning the level of goodness are single-peaked and 
symmetric around G* so that at each period t subjects minimize the distance |Gt-G*|, 
where Gt is the moral self-worth at t. 
In a dynamic context, this level G* may be difficult to maintain since life requires 
difficult  decisions  with  a  moral  content  to  be  taken  over  time.  To  represent  this, 5	 ﾠ
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assume that at period t the individual must take a decision that will put her at a level 
of moral self-worth either higher than G* or lower. We assume for simplicity that a 
single decision has to be taken each period, it cannot be avoided and that decisions are 
not neutral, that is, decisions always affect moral self-esteem.  
We assume for simplicity that the decision at each period t is binary; the subject may 
either have good behavior, which increases goodness by gt>0 or bad behavior which 
decreases  it  by  bt>0.  Depending  on  the  decision  taken,  she  will  enter  period  t+1 
having a level of moral self-worth Gt=G*+ gt or Gt=G*- bt.  
 




As shown in Graph 1, the subject decides again in period t+1 . If her decision was 
good in period t, she should choose bad in period t+1 as long as Gt+1 =G*+ gt - bt+1 is 
closer to the optimal value G*  than Gt+1=G*+ gt+ gt+1.  
Note that if the decision good or bad is always symmetric, that is, if gt = bt = g = b 
for all t, then the subject should always choose the decision opposite to the previous 
one, to get as close as possible to G*. 6	 ﾠ
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Assuming  that  gt=g  and  bt=b  for  all  t,  what  happens  if  the  decisions  are  not 
symmetric (g≠b)?  Take for example the case b=3g, that is, the cost of a bad action is 
three times the benefit of a good one. Then starting from G*, to minimize |Gt-G*| at 
each t, the subject’s decisions should follow a regular pattern: (….gg b ggg b ggg b 
……..), three good actions are always followed by a bad one.  
More generally, if b=ng, where n is an integer and an even number, starting from G* 
the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern: (n/2 actions g, one action b, 
n actions g, one action b, n actions g, one action b ……). If n is an odd number, the 
sequence is: ((n+1)/2 actions g, one action b, n actions g, one action b, n actions g, 
one action b ……). If 1/n is an integer, and even number: (n/2 actions b, one action g, 
n actions b, one action g, n actions b, one action g ……). If 1/n is odd: ((n+1)/2 
actions b, one action g, n actions b, one action g, n actions b, one action g ……).
‡ 
This  result  implies  that  individuals  self-regulate  to  achieve  their  optimal  level  of 
moral  self-worth  G*  and  this  self-regulation  follows  a  regular  pattern.  Whenever 
decisions with a moral content cannot be avoided, individuals will alternate bad and 
good actions over time. 
In our experiment, we test whether these regular patterns predicted by the theory 
appear when subjects have to take sequential decisions involving moral self-worth. 
 
III. THE EXPERIMENT 
The dictator game 
In the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994), the first player, "the proposer" (dictator), 
determines  an  allocation  (split)  of  some  endowment  (such  as  a  cash  prize).  The 
second  player,  "the  responder"  (recipient),  simply  receives  the  share  of  the 
endowment left by the proposer. The responder's role is entirely passive.  
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‡ See the appendix for proof of this result. 
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Formally,  given  an  endowment  of  size  D,  the 
dictator must decide any value of di∈[0, D] to pass 
to the recipient. Therefore the final distribution of 
benefits is a pair:  
(D-di , di) 
where D-di is the dictator’s benefit. Since the Nash 
equilibrium  is  giving  zero  to  the  recipient,  any 
strictly  positive  donation,  di>0,  is  interpreted  as 
pure altruism. 
 
Graph 2. The Dictator game 
 
Participants 
176 subjects distributed in four sessions participated in the experiment (dictators and 
recipients). We will focus only on the sample of 88 dictators (32 % of women) since 
recipients  do  not  play  any  active  role  in  our  analysis.  The  participants  were 
undergraduate students at the Universidad de la República (Uruguay).  All of them 
were volunteers who answered a public call.  
Procedures and materials 
The subjects were given verbal and printed information: they had to take 16 decisions 
and each one was explained on one page of a printed booklet. They were not allowed 
to speak to one another and they were seated in such a way that they could not see the 
written responses of the other subjects.  
The baseline treatment consisted of a standard dictator game in which each participant 
was a dictator or a recipient (the participants knew that no one would play both roles). 
The dictator had to allocate 10 bills of 20 Uruguay pesos (around 10 US dollars) 
between herself and a randomly chosen student placed in a different room. Following 
List (2007) instructions, the task was explained on one sheet of paper inside a printed 
booklet and the possible payoffs were presented on a line in which the subject had to 
mark her decision with a circle. The amount of money ranked from 0 pesos (left-end) 
to 200 pesos (right-end) and the donations were restricted to multiples of 20 including 
zero. 8	 ﾠ
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The rest of the treatments were identical to the baseline (blind) with the exception of 
the framing. In order to frame the task, we used information that participants gave at 
the moment they registered for the experiment: sex, income category and ideological 
category.  This  information  was  used  to  label  the  participants  as  women/men, 
rich/poor and right-wing/left-wing.
§ 
In three treatments, the donor was told that the recipient would know the donor’s sex, 
income category or ideological category, respectively. In six treatments, the donor 
knew  one  characteristic  of  the  recipient  (sex  or  income  category  or  ideological 
category).  In  another  six  treatments,  besides  knowing  one  characteristic  of  the 
recipient, the donor was told that the recipient would know the game’s framing (for 
example, the recipient would know that the donation was done from a woman to a 
man). 
The entire booklet consisted of sixteen tasks that were presented in a different random 
order for each subject. This is an important characteristic of the design: as in each 
round the donors are facing different frames, even if all participants had the same 
preferences, we would not necessarily observe an equalizing pattern common to all 
subjects.  
We paid only one decision (randomly chosen) to each dictator which avoids the effect 
of accumulation of earnings in the course of the session. Besides, the use of different 
recipients and frames at each decision helped to maintain subjects’ interest. Notice 
that  once  a  decision  is  taken,  subsequent  decisions  by  the  same  subject  cannot 
actually hurt or help the same recipient. Thus, if the donor makes what he thinks is a 
selfish  (generous)  decision,  the  subsequent  action  will  not  compensate  the  prior 
recipient since the recipients are different individuals; any compensation effect affects 
exclusively moral self-worth with this design. 
The money donated to recipients was delivered to them in a different session. Taking 
all the games into consideration, the average dictator’s earnings in the 16 games were 
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§ We asked the participants to fill out a questionnaire where they revealed their personal ideological 
position and the socio-economic status of their household in a 10-steps scale where 1 was extreme 
poor/left wing and 10 was extreme rich/right wing. In order to build binary labels (poor/rich, left-
wing/right-wing), the threshold was the median value of the reported distributions. 	 ﾠ9	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US$142.5 (7 bills) and, consequently, the average recipient’s earnings were US$57.5 
(3 bills). 
IV. RESULTS 
According to the theoretical framework described in Section II, we would expect a 
negative correlation between the donation at  t  and that at period t+1. We test this 
hypothesis in a dynamic panel data model where we estimate the donation at period t 
(dt) as a function of past donation (dt-1): 
 
where   denotes the unobserved individual-specific time-invariant fixed effect
**;   
is the it-th observation of explanatory variables, in our case, treatment dummies and 
temporal trend; the disturbance terms   has zero mean, constant variance and is 
uncorrelated across time and individuals. 
We use two-step GMM
†† estimators with the Windmeijer correction using lagged 
levels (t-2, t-3 and t-4) of the dependent variable as instruments (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Windmeijer, 2005). 
Table 1 shows the results of three regressions. In the first one, the only covariate is 
the previous donation (dt-1); in regression (2) we also include the treatment dummies 
and in regression (3) we add a temporal trend. In the three estimations, the coefficient 
of past donation (dt-1) is negative, significant at 5% and less than one in absolute 
value. Besides, the trend is not significant. In the bottom part of Table 1 we show 
Arellano-Bond tests.
‡‡ 
The important result here is that donations follow a stationary AR(1) process with 
negative coefficient. Hence, subjects tend to balance a donation above the mean in a 
round with a donation below in the following round. 
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**	 ﾠBy construction, di,t-1	 ﾠis correlated with αi . It then makes no sense to used random effects estimation 
method since one regressor is correlated with the individual effects.	 ﾠ
††	 ﾠGeneralized Method of Moments.	 ﾠ
‡‡	 ﾠArellano and Bond (1991) proposed a test to detect serial correlation in the disturbances. When the 
null hypothesis of this test (no serial correlation) is not rejected, validation of the instrumental variables 
is obtained	 ﾠ10	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Table 1: Moral cleansing and licensing 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Round (t)  -  -  0.195 
(0.430) 





















Instruments  40  43  44 
Sample Size  1220  1220  1220 
p-values in parentheses. 
This result does not support the alternative hypothesis that subjects would always 
donate according to their moral standards and show consistent preferences for a given 
level of donation. On the contrary, the pattern of donations over time shows a self-
regulation behavior and emerges as the result of a systematic process of dynamic 
equalization: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) or cleansing (altruistic after 
selfish). 
We also check if donations follow an AR(2) process. We find that the coefficient of 
 is not significant, whereas the coefficient of   is still negative and significant 
(show Table 2). 
Table 2: Moral cleansing and licensing, with 2 lags 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Round (t)  -  -  -0.021 
(0.938) 



























Instruments  39  42  43 
Sample Size  1130  1130  1130 




As  a  simple  robustness  test,  we  check  whether  our  results  change  when  we  use 
different sample sizes. Table 3 shows the same regressions as before but using the last 
12 periods (t=5, 6, … , 16) and the last 8 periods (t=9, 10, … , 16). Given that every 
individual  played  the  16  games  in  a  different  random  order,  we  lose  different 
treatments’ observations for each individual.  
Table 3: Robustness checks 
  Rounds 5 to 16  Rounds 9 to 16 
  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Round (t)  -  -  0.021 
(0.931) 
-  -  0.240 
(0.625) 







































Instruments  37  40  41  25  28  29 
Sample Size  1046  1046  1046  695  695  695 
p-values in parentheses. 
There are no remarkable differences when we compare results from Table 1 and Table 
3. Hence, using all or only the final rounds of the experiment does not make any 
difference. 
Lastly, Table 4 shows an additional robustness check. We estimate the AR(1) model -
with controls- for a sample of 68 subjects randomly selected, that is, we drop 20 
subjects. We repeat the exercise removing another 20 different subjects and finally we 
repeat the process a third time. Table 3 shows the estimated AR(1) coefficients for the 
three sub-samples (elimination #1, #2 and #3). 
Two additional robustness checks are shown at the bottom of Table 4. We estimate 
the AR(1) coefficients when observations from the baseline are not included; results 
are even stronger (p-value=0.01). We also  run a model removing people who donate 12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the  same  quantity  in  all  rounds,  and  the  results  are  identical  to  those  obtained 
previously. 
Table 4: Additional robustness checks 
  AR(1) Coefficient  p-value  Sample Size 
Removal of 20 participants       
elimination #1  -0.115  0.026  944 
elimination #2  -0.105  0.057  941 
elimination #3  -0.089  0.068  940 
without “Blind”  -0.133  0.014  989 
without “Constant”  -0.089  0.034  1094 
 
Our  experimental  results  indicate  that  the  coefficient  of  the  participant’s  previous 
donation is significant and negative, which is consistent with our hypothesis that over 
time individuals self-regulate to attain the optimal level of self-worth.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This research contributes to the literature that focuses on the role of moral cleansing 
and moral self-licensing on behavior. Our results show that donations do not have a 
trend over time in a dictator game setting. However this stability across time cannot 
be interpreted as the result of strong preferences for altruism. In contrast, this stability 
emerges  as  the  result  of  equalization.  In  the  estimations,  the  past  donation  (dt-1) 
coefficient  is  always  negative,  significant  and  its  absolute  value  is  less  than  one- 
indicating that subjects who behaved nicely yesterday are selfish today and vice versa. 
In short, a systematic moral self-licensing and moral cleansing pattern emerges.  
Our  findings  are  related  to  the  current  theories  of  identity  (Akerlof  and  Kranton, 
2000). When decisions are not morally neutral, each decision affects the sense of 
identity and implies a deviation from the optimal level of moral self-worth, which 
requires a compensating subsequent decision. We have identified this self-regulation 
behavior empirically, which in our experiment takes the form of an autoregressive 
process of order 1 with a negative coefficient: a high (low) donation is followed by a 
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Appendix 
The optimal sequence of actions 
We assume that whenever the subject is indifferent between a good and a bad action, 
she chooses the one with the lowest payoff: b if b<g and g if g≤b. 
Assume b=ng, n a positive integer and an even number. Starting from G*, the subject 
has the choice between G*-b or G*+g, and she should choose G*+g since it is closer 
to G*. The same is true in the following periods up to period n/2. After n/2 periods, 
the  subject  is  at  G*+(n/2)g.  She  is  then  indifferent  between  G*+(n/2)g  and 
G*+(n/2)g–b=G*+(n/2)g –ng= G*-(n/2)g, so that the next decision should be g since 
G*+(n/2)g–b is closer to G* than G*+(n/2)g+g. 
 
Example. Assume G*=100, b=10 and g=2. Then n=5. The subject would follow the 
sequence (g,g,g,b,g,g,g,g,g,b,....): 100, 102, 104, 106, 96, 98,100,102, 104,... 
  
When  n  is  not  an  integer,  the  optimal  sequence  of  actions  takes  a  slightly  more 
complicated form. For example, if n=3.5, the optimal sequence is (.....3 g’s, b, 4 g’s, 
b, 3 g’s, b, 4 g’s, b,…..). 
The case b=g/n  follows by symmetry. 
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